University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book
chapters and other publications

Jepson School of Leadership Studies

12-16-2010

Christian Realism and Augustinian (?) Liberalism
Peter Iver Kaufman
University of Richmond, pkaufman@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jepson-faculty-publications
Part of the Christianity Commons, History of Christianity Commons, Leadership Studies
Commons, Philosophy Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion
Commons
Recommended Citation
Kaufman, Peter Iver. "Christian Realism and Augustinian (?) Liberalism." Journal of Religious Ethics 38, no. 4 (December 16, 2010):
699-724. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9795.2010.00460.x.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

1

*A version of the article was published in the Journal of Religious Ethics 38, no. 4 (December
16, 2010): 699-724. Please take any quotations from the published version.

Christian Realism and Augustinian (?) Liberalism
Surely there is enough kindling lying about in the Bible and in subsequent moral theology to fire
up love for neighbors and compassion for countless “friends” in foreign parts--and in crisis. And, surely,
the momentum of love’s labor for the just redistribution of resources, fueled by activists’ appeals for
solidarity, should be sustained by stressing that we are creatures made for affection, not for aggression.
Yet experience, plus the history of the Christian traditions, taught Reinhold Niebuhr, who memorably
reminded Christian realists, how often love was “defeated,” how a “strategy of brotherhood . . .
degenerates from mutuality to a prudent regard for the interests of self and from an impulse towards
community to an acceptance of the survival impulse as ethically normative” (Niebuhr 1964, 2:96).
But he was encouraged after reading Augustine. The late antique African bishop nudged
Niebuhr to look for the “formula for leavening the city of this world with the love of the city of God”
(Niebuhr 1953, 134). The authors of the books before us are still looking. They concede, as did Niebuhr,
that Augustine’s monumental City of God explicitly sets limits on love’s effectiveness on the practice of
politics. They refuse, nonetheless, as did Niebuhr, to offer any “blanket judgments about the power of
the state,” although they acknowledge that politics tends to trick practitioners to overlook limits and to
become “idolatrous[ly]” infatuated with what governments can do (Lovin 1995, 180-84; Lovin 2008, 19899).
Augustine did indulge in blanket judgments. I shall contend that he yanked his comprehensive
condemnation wholly over bed and body politic. True, the contention is controversial, though few
historians would dispute that, by the early fifth century, he had swapped whatever was left of his
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political optimism for much lower estimates of what his faith could contribute to political deliberations.
Why? Rome’s military setbacks across the Mediterranean as well as rivalries and insurrections in Africa
may account for his disenchantment. Almost certainly, his general sense of humanity’s “fallen” condition
contributed. The most conspicuous sign of the damage from that fall, concupiscence, was a pervasive,
inordinate desire for worldly possessions and for position. Christianity’s harping on the impermanence
of wealth, social advantage, and domination seemed to have little effect, yet Augustine kept to that
course. Still, he believed that while their faith helped Christians offload guilt, nothing could undo what
the first sin of humanity’s parents and their fall from grace had done. Non posse non peccare; the
faithful were unable to behave impeccably.
Pessimism pegged to such observations and the observations themselves are seldom welcome.
Early fifth-century idealists, notably the Pelagians and Donatists got shirty with Augustine who scolded
them for being naively perfectionist. One finds that his and Niebuhr’s anti-utopian imperatives still play
today. For their part, Christian realists have been known to trot out the two, assuming that neither
meant his emphasis on the pervasive and--for Augustine--a providential presence of evil to lead to moral
paralysis. With help, good could come from evil, not in the form of political settlements, Augustine
surmised, but as personal sentiments, that is, as promising shoots sprouting from the ruins of a fallen
nature. We grow compassion. For that reason, “in the face of a massive and persistent presence of evil
in the world,” Charles Mathewes notes, “we continue to insist that the basic truth about the world is its
goodness . . . if not its justice, at least its basalt worthiness and inherent value.” That phrase, “if not its
justice,” appears to me to be a telling disclaimer; in effect--if not also in intent--it puts politics beyond
the pale, and it acknowledges that Augustine considered combat against corruption to be first and
foremost intrapsychic. The objective was not to reform government or rehabilitate “the state” but to
win over the soul--not to sift political malpractice but to correct the “sinful misdisposition of our will
articulated in our habits” (Mathewes 2001, 70-74).
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Niebuhr’s Christian realism seems less severe and more inclined to harbor hopes for
“progressive justice.” Geoffrey Rees attributes Niebuhr’s spiffed-up Augustinianism to his “rejection of
any literalistic interpretation of original sin” (Rees 2003, 88-91). The notion that the disobedience of Eve
and Adam left an indelible stain on human character was useful in Augustine’s campaigns against
alleged Pelagian perfectionism, yet original sin precludes neither moral improvement nor the possibility
that moral progress could have meaningful political effects. Still, Augustine had little confidence in
Roman leadership--imperial, regional, and municipal. He concluded that an eerily irrepressible ambition
or desire to dominate drove all political practice. He occasionally wrote as if government might surprise
him. He noticed the odd civic official who did not dive like a cormorant into the corridors of power. He
awarded Emperor Theodosius high marks for prudence and piety (Augustine 1972, 221-22: 5.26). Hence,
it is not inconceivable that Augustine, without thinking that vera justitia, “genuine justice,” was possible
this side of the grave (74-75: 2.21), could still have hoped for “progressive justice,” as did Niebuhr when
he departed the slums of industrial Detroit for New York, where he studied the surges of Christian
realism in the early fifth century and drafted a “definition of ‘realism’ [that] implies that idealists are
subject to illusions about social realities, which,” he added, “indeed they are” (Niebuhr 1953, 119).

Augustine had plenty of chances to see scoundrels around him at work in government in Italy
and Africa. He read Livy’s accounts of ambition and was familiar with Sallust’s brooding over corruption.
He was under no illusions about social realities (Harding 2008, 47-83; Kaufman 2007, 115-18). Christians
were pilgrims or resident aliens this side of the grave. The nineteenth chapter of Augustine’s City of God
suggests the tensions they experience when they try to be of service where they find themselves. 1
Gerald Schlabach reads the City’s recommendations as an argument for “Augustinian
continence,” by which he means the “evangelical self-denial” that inspires profound, mutual caring
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among Christians ( Schlabach 2001, 87). His core assertion is that such love far exceeds benevolence,
but, elaborating, Schlabach mostly manages lots of nots: “caritas-working-through-continence” is not
domineering, not acquisitive, not manipulative (73-75, 90-91). The difficulty is that Augustine did resort
to manipulation and coercion while attempting to take over or, in places, to take back basilicas from
Donatist Christians. Schlabach concedes that, “arguably, the effort was an act of incontinence,”
acknowledging that his subject was “grasping domineeringly for a good [the reunification of African
Christianity and creation of “an order of mutual love”] that Christians must receive rather as a gift”
(166). Schlabach is not alone, as we shall see; others, looking for love and liberalism in Augustine’s
career, are tormented by evidence that he sanctioned the use of intimidation to bring clerical and lay
members of the pars Donati into the supra-regional church from which their forerunners seceded a
century earlier. The secessionists’ bishops were unworldly. Less well traveled than their rivals-Augustine’s episcopal colleagues--they claimed a superior righteousness, even as their provincialism
made their sense of superiority and century-long defiance of imperial and church leadership seem
ludicrous to more refined Christians. We return to Donatism shortly, because Augustine’s efforts to
suppress it and the sometimes surly disposition he showed in defending them make it particularly hard
for Augustinian liberals to chauffer him into their camp. At the moment, we need only note what
Schlabach describes as “an almost Donatist clarity of vision,” which seems to inform Augustine’s
understanding of how continence, love, and patience should work within the church. Schlabach has his
man flirt with the perfectionism he so criticized. Yet, within a few pages, Schlabach repents having
Augustine package the charms of church life too attractively, restoring the “ongoing tension” in
Augustine’s ecclesiology. Life as it is in churches, families, and political institutions is not as it ought to
be (116-18).
Whereas Schlabach concentrates on inspiring caregivers and compassion in churches, Robert
Dodaro’s study of a love that practices patience and politics bears more directly on the interests of
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current Christian realists and Augustinian liberals who write to chauffer their favorite bishop into their
camp. In Dodaro’s Christ and the Just Society in the thought of Augustine, a closely argued but
wonderfully readable book, readers can eavesdrop as the late antique prelate counsels Christian
statesmen. The title gives away the general content of such counsel--that Augustine made direct
connections between virtues commended in the gospels and the kind of political engagement that
should make a government progressively more just and, finally, genuinely just. [You need a transition
marker here between your views and your overview of the problems in trying to co-opt Augustine
into one political perspective or another and your consideration of the 4 books. I was confused. ]
Dodaro is an excellent historical theologian, too good to overlook those anti-utopian
“imperatives” in Augustine’s correspondence and in the polemical treatises against perfectionism, to
which we have already alluded, yet he locates a cautious, rather obscurely coded optimism in the City of
God, despite that text’s declarations positioning terrestrial cities far from vera justitia, true or genuine
justice. Justice of that sort requires that all receive their due, but, with everyone angling for advantage
in this wicked world, God gets shortchanged. Fallen human nature stubbornly refuses to give God
divinity’s due, reverence expressed liturgically and in self-denying love (Augustine 1972, 882: 19.21).
One result, that political practice becomes hostage to practitioners’ desire to dominate, means that the
servitude of some to others is unavoidable. Where can Christ be linked with a just society, then, save in
Dodaro’s title? Schlbach’s reply is the church; Dodaro’s answer, the virtuous intentions of faithful,
humble statesmen who accept Jesus Christ as the impresario of their souls’ “efforts to overcome
obstacles to the true knowledge and worship of God,” efforts that become preconditions for the
“creation and preservation of a just society” (Dodaro 2004, 31).
The creation and preservation of a genuinely just society? Before the hereafter? Was Augustine
striving towards that end? Dodaro elsewhere collects evidence of the bishop’s political “activism” in a
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tidy, small heap, composed chiefly of advice offered public officials, yet Augustine comes across as a
man without a plan. No consistently proposed and argued public policy surfaces. Indeed, as Dodaro
admits, Augustine’s “activity responds to particular social ills as they arose among the people for whose
pastoral care he feels responsible.” He was not programmatically political, but he understood that he
was pastorally responsible for statesmen who were--and who, Dodaro tells us, were attracted by two
types of heroism (Dodaro 2005, 110-11).
The first was conventional. Romans’ heroes sought glory and popularity in this life and only
secondarily, if at all, valued God’s approval now and reward later (Augustine 1972, 203: 5.14). The
second was apostolic, the heroism countenanced by Christianity’s first apostles. It placed pleasing God
above all else (Dodaro 2004, 53). Chiding leaders for their attachments to conventional concepts of the
heroic, Augustine, according to Dodaro, bent every effort to increase the appeal of the apostolic.
Celebrated public servants’ popularity occasionally survived their deaths, Augustine said, but popularity
was a “surrogate immortality.” And celebrity, obsessively pursued, as it often was, kept would-be heroes
from pursuing “true piety and the happiness it imparts.” Assurances that they were--and would forever
be--citizens of the celestial city compensated the Christian statesmen for the know-nothing crowds’
adulation. True, Rome’s poets had said otherwise. But Augustine charged that the immortality they
packaged as fame was a scam. He set heroism and immortality in a scriptural context, defining both as
God’s gifts. So says Dodaro, and he is right. Statesmen receiving such gifts become known by “public
acknowledgment of the limits of their virtue through prayer” and, simultaneously, “by means of this
prayer,” piety purifies the intention behind other virtues, such as justice, with the result that these, too,
are rendered true” (57).
Dodaro stations “true” justice somewhere between intention and realization, implying that the
latter, politically, is within reach. But his book’s brilliance, to my eyes, shows best in its anatomy of the
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former--intention. Dodaro probes Augustine’s interests in statesmen’s motives, interests that appear to
me predominantly pastoral rather than political. Political endeavor and apology have pastoral
dimensions, Charles Mathewes points out, citing Lincoln’s second inaugural address and the insights
bracing it (as the “cultivation of the holy terror that is integral to true piety”). Mathewes has the “public
sphere become . . . the forum for an ascetical inquiry,” which, in turn, “better shapes” officeholders
“more fully to receive God’s grace” (Mathewes 2007, 259-60). Dodaro’s Augustine tried something a bit
different. He deployed a series of contrasts beginning with two distinctive kinds of heroism then peeling
back to the different intimations of immortality each implied and to the reigning reactions to mortality.
Fortitude trumped faith in the ways Rome’s statesmen faced death, because they had been beguiled by
their poets. Recent military and political humiliations had gone some distance towards sobering up
citizens, yet those resenting the new faith and envying its growing influence blamed Christianity for their
empire’s setbacks. The first ten books of Augustine’s City of God record his answer. Dodaro revisits
their rehearsal of the failures of Rome’s religions and philosophies to “offer efficacious solutions to the
fear of death.” Augustine to the rescue: he supplied new “solutions,” among them, an authentic,
Christian immortality (as opposed to a surrogate, pagan immortality) “in tandem with the rejection of
the value of the examples of virtue offered by Rome’s most outstanding citizens.” Death, Dodaro adds,
“is truly defeated only when the soul desires God over all other goods” and when that desire lays at the
foundation of a Christianized concept of civic virtue. The City of God becomes that concept’s showcase.
Therein, old ideas about heroism and public service “are redefined and transformed in a Christian key,
thus redefining the just society itself” (35-36).
What might “the just society itself” have looked like in the Christian statesmen’s intentions?
Dodaro suggests that it could have crystallized as devout politicians’ urges to translate “the penitential
qualities of their faith’s saints” into civic virtues. Augustine, he surmises, would have hoped so. The
bishop believed that Rome’s old ideas about honor and glory, which had shaped “political discourses,”
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were ripe for replacement. Their function as counters to the statesmen’s fear of death had been
undermined by Christianity. They were obsolete. Their place could be reserved for the new faith and
“the penitential qualities” if its saints (183).
Dodaro explains how this substitution and transformation might have worked--if not in political
practice, at least in Augustine’s political thought. The “technology” was dependent on repentance.
Statesmen’s sorrow for their sins was “the experiential basis from which to generate sympathy for
others.” Sorrow built solidarity, initially the faithful statesman’s solidarity with fallen humanity. King
David and the apostle Peter were the models; agonizing over their sins, they became better rulers (201202). Politics became, for Dodaro’s Augustine, a public penance. He reinvented “the state.” He knew no
ruler could get that completely right; he was too much a Christian realist, Dodaro admits, to hope for a
perfectly virtuous leader. But he was no pessimist. He saved statesmen from the “surrogate
immortality” that had long informed political practice, scolded them for sin, mentioned their mortality
to inspire them and save them from a “second,” eternal death, preached repentance to them, and led
them to live “under a divine pardon.” For their part, they then governed mercifully and justly (212).
No easy task. Rulers must first learn then teach “truths that are shrouded in the darkness of
mystery and within a depth of wisdom that is hidden from reason.” They must compellingly present
“the spiritual arts of penitence.” Dodaro’s Augustine grows optimistic as the pages turn. At least,
Dodaro seems to grow more optimistic--and less realistic--for his subject. Augustine is said to have
dreamed of high-minded authorities, “their attention fixed on the heavenly city,” nonetheless
promoting the civic virtues of citizens whom they draw “away from concern with the illusory
achievement of moral and spiritual autonomy and towards the freedom to live interiorly as citizens in
God’s city” (218). Dodaro concludes with that crescendo. But the passage from the rulers’ probity and
citizens’ interiority to “the creation and preservation of a just society,” arguably, looked more difficult
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to Augustine [elaborate a bit more?] (Kaufman 2007, 228-30). There is no denying, however, that
Dodaro’s scalpel has given us a good look at Augustine’s anatomy of statesmen’s intentions--at what he
thought they had been as well as at what he hoped they might become. Christian realists may object to
that last bit, but Dodaro will challenge them to reconsider their paladin’s views on political virtue. No
denying also that Dodaro has stitched up an Augustine who will prove quite useful to Augustinian
liberals, who, as one of their cleverest, philosophically well-informed, and articulate new recruits says,
believe that their man was devoted to placing “hopeful pressures . . . on all politics” (Gregory 2008,

361).
Eric Gregory’s marvelous book, Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of
Democratic Citizenship, rakes Augustine’s many remarks on, and exhortations to, love into suggestive
discussions of civic virtue. When Christian realists comment on the mischief that passes as politics and
on establishment values spiked with dollops of American exceptionalism, they tend to recall Augustine’s
stress on sin and self-interest. If liberals looking to rehabilitate political practices relish what Augustine
wrote about love, they have a feast in Gregory’s expositions, which start, as Dodaro did, with the
restructuring of desire: “Love must be trained” (262). Once trained, freshly and highly motivated rulers
and citizens pore over the conundrums related to governing, which sometimes stump Christian realists,
and register new solutions. Gregory can be rather hard on those stumped, saddened realists who are,
he avers, disposed to “denigrate the social functions of non-ecclesiastical communities that aspire to
justice” and who forget that love is as formidable as sin--indeed, more formidable--in political theology.
Christian realists, that is, do not see how the ordo amoris at the center of Augustine’s “true political
theology” can become an extraordinary resource for developing “an ethic of citizenship” and civic virtue
(136-38).
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Politics and the Order of Love does exactly what its title promises; it couples the two, infusing
the former with the latter. And Gregory infuses the whole with a sense of urgency. “The time has
come,” he says, “to put Augustinian liberalism more explicitly within its proper context of critical
admiration of liberal virtues and the aspirations of perfection rather than one of relentless negation”
(32). With little evidence, however, Gregory is absolutely certain that Augustine shared his urgency, that
the late antique bishop “was consumed with the task of responding to the allegation” that Christianity
undermined public order (59). “Consumed”? Augustine more often seems composed than consumed.
He as much as conceded some incompatibility between that “true” theology and politics when he
explained that the virtues prescribed by Christianity’s sacred texts, “forbearance and benevolence,
should be kept secretly in one’s own mind” as one--say a Christian who acquiesces to become a
magistrate--upholds a judgment that requires retribution as well as reparations (Augustine 2001, 37:
epistle 138.13).
But Gregory is not just troubled by realists’ “relentless negation[s].” He is equally upset by
secular liberals’ efforts to close the road “from religious convictions to political commitments” (Gregory
2008, 61). Perhaps the most celebrated, John Rawls, affixes to some of his appeals to “public reason”
prohibitions against letting religious faiths that, by definition, are comprehensive and exclusive into the
public forum. Such faiths, he argues, cultivate a “zeal to embody the whole truth in politics,” quite
contrary to the survival of “an idea of public reason that belongs with democratic citizenship” (Rawls
1997, 766-67). Appeals to public reason foster reciprocity; appeals to faith have been known to
promote “political virtues found in political liberalism” (794), though religious faith has been known-too often for Rawls--to torpedo “the principle of toleration” so basic to every liberal, constitutional
regime. Piety in power is pernicious. It depreciates the liberties of the religiously indifferent and of any
who appear religiously different--or deviant (782-83). Rawls therefore consigns debates between
comprehensive religious doctrines to a “background culture”--to an obscurity that, Gregory complains,
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would effectively proscribe “Christian political advocacy” and thus “domesticate” religion’s “prophetic
witness” (Gregory 2008, 65). Close the road from religious convictions to political commitment, and you
close an artery through which compassion flows into political deliberations. Love empowers justice;
Augustinian liberalism inspires love. So, should Rawlsian liberals succeed restricting religious speech in
public life, their liberal societies would--near fatally--neglect “the need to replenish the moral energies
that sustain liberalism” (66).
Gregory assembles a small army to punch that point home in his second and third chapters.
Objections to dour Christian realists and secularizing Rawlsians billow from those pages. Jean Bethke
Elshtain, Timothy Jackson, Rowan Williams, Joan Tronto, Charles Mathewes, Oliver O’Donovan, and
Susan Okin, among others, assist Gregory in making the claim that Augustinian liberalism is vital to the
“moral conversation about politics,” which, in turn, is vital to political liberalism (148).
Then he tackles Hannah Arendt. For much of the mid-section of Gregory’s book, Arendt is his
prime target. Her interpretation of the concept of love in Augustine’s work, which makes her exquisite
doctoral dissertation still worth reading, seems to have had a profound effect on the opinions she later
formulated about modernity, forgiveness, and civic responsibility. Gregory, following Mathewes and
Elshtain, intriguingly intimates that Arendt’s confrontations with totalitarianism bear comparison with
Augustine’s face-offs with imperialism and that his “mature” anti-Manichaean reconceptualization of
evil (as deficit) is somewhat analogous to her controversial remarks about “the banality of evil” in the
twentieth century (198-99). What disappoints Gregory is Arendt’s depoliticization of Augustine’s ordo
amoris. She subscribes to interpretations that distinguish between cupiditas and caritas and that make
it difficult to find a place for the love of neighbor in his thinking because caritas turns wholeheartedly to
eternity. Arendt’s Augustine, in effect, “obscures the relevance of the neighbor” (233). The title of
Gregory’s fourth chapter, “Love as Political Vice,” gives his displeasure away, although he sees that
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Augustine’s understanding of love, filtered through Arendt, is really less vicious than vacuous. When she
finished with her subject, Christian love was so theocentric that “civic virtue” was left undersourced.
Love was “worldless”; “rather than providing a founding principle for politics, [it] turn[ed] out finally to
prevent politics” (217).
The doctrine of the Incarnation, the union of divine and human natures in Jesus Christ, Gregory
imagines, kept Augustine from Arendt’s conclusions. The love for God was love for all neighbors,
collected, one might say, in the savior. Yet, Gregory claims, Arendt let neo-Platonism colonize
Augustine’s Christology so that “the Incarnation . . . serves as a distraction from attending to the other in
his or her alterity.” And “Christ as the divine neighbor absorbs the integrity of all neighbor love” (223).
Arendt allegedly quizzed her own conclusions and tried to correct for this “absorption,” which, Gregory
says, “prevents politics,” but she was unsuccessful. Her attempts left him unappeased. At her
dissertation’s end, “genuine neighbor-love,” for Arendt’s Augustine, “consists in drawing the neighbor
into the stream of God’s love” (337); “the concrete horizontal encounter with the neighbor is always
only mediated, and finally deferred, to the vertical relation to God” (222).
Gregory dislikes “deferrals” of this sort and supposes that Augustine would as well. But it is (and
was?) only one of the two more egregious kinds of “escapism” that could curb plans in the fourth, fifth,
and twenty-first centuries to “operationalize” love “as a political virtue” (298). Making “worldless” love
superior to affections lavished on beloved friends is one danger. Another makes love too worldly,
whereupon spectacles obscure genuine compassion (282). Gregory illustrates that second danger with a
story from the fourth book of Augustine’s Confessions in which the narrator records his alarm at the
grief he expressed on learning of a friend’s death. He mourned theatrically and learned later, according
to Arendt, that his friendship and extravagant mourning had fettered him to the things of this world.
The lesson was an emancipation enabling him, Arendt says--and Gregory disapprovingly repeats--“to
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make a desert out of the world and to protect his love for God.” Gregory prefers to think that
Augustine’s distress was due to the ease with which “loving love . . . eclipse[d] the particularism of love”
(285).
He appreciates that “the particularism of love” can be problematic. With clues from colleagues
Rowan Williams and Oliver O’Donovan, he looks for “a more nuanced mediation between the universal
and particular.” And he learns that, as love becomes politically “operationalized,” it “continually expands
the circle of neighborly concern.” Gregory infers that Augustine intended his distinctively Christian
version of friendship to “extend the possibilities of virtue beyond a philosophical elite” and right into the
public forum where “an Augustinian ethic of democratic citizenship”--Gregory’s subtitle--can “both
democratize . . . and publicize . . . love through a theological (and political) populism” (353-55). Did
Augustine do the democratizing? Or is Gregory responsible for the transitions, from love through power
to justice, to “the creation and preservation of a just society”? The great virtue of Gregory’s book, I
think, is that it positions Augustine’s ordo amoris quite usefully in contemporary political discourse. But
Gregory appears to award Augustine too much of the credit for what he, Dodaro, and other
“Augustinian liberals” achieve, “plac[ing] the emotions squarely in the context of morality itself” and
“plac[ing] morality at the center of political theology” (291). And there, at that center, the moral,
political, theological injunction to advance the interests of the weak before those of the strong acquires
considerable influence, supported by the liberals’ reading of the gospels and their reconstructions of a
“collectivist Christology” that Augustine purportedly promoted on the basis of Christ’s enduring
presence in or to humanity, especially to “the least of these my brethren” (348-49, citing Matthew
25:40).
Gregory’s book draws a few practical, political implications. The aforesaid injunction, for
example, might “guide practical deliberations in agenda setting for scarce resources” (296). One can
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imagine Obama’s Augustinian liberals coupling discussions of distributive justice with talk of universal
health care coverage. Likely, Christian realists, to some extent setting aside Augustine’s emphasis on
personal or political fallibility and marinating plans for progressive justice, could usefully deploy
Augustine’s endorsements--in his Confessions, correspondence, and sermons--of a “Gregorian” “love
that sees real others,” endorsements that, amplified in Gregory’s study, seem to me to have settled on
the frontiers of utopia. For Gregory, however, those endorsements are sum and substance of a “morally
robust Augustinian civic liberalism” and an Augustinian “populism,” to boot (298). 2
Of course, the terms “liberalism” and “populism” are hard to parse under the best
circumstances, which seldom include peering from the present into the remote past. Can we call
Augustine a populist? Conrad Leyser, the first named of Gregory’s “many recent interpreters” who
“emphasize the populist implications of Augustine’s theology” (355), does maintain that the bishop,
while preaching on the relationships between monasticism and the church, tried “to avoid the
appearance . . . of spiritual elitism” (Leyser 2000, 12-13). Yet at no point, does Leyser say that abbots or
bishops (or Augustine) prodded or should have prodded municipal, regional, and imperial officials to be
more egalitarian and, therefore, more just. When Leyser finds Augustine reflecting on questions of
community and authority, in semi-retirement, he “confirmed rather than altered his basic premises.
Disillusion with the monastic community in the saeculum,” as Leyser would have it, appears “to have
made still more sharply focused his vision of the eschatological community of the elect and still more
attenuated his estimation of what those in power in the saeculum could knowingly achieve” (26). That
sounds right to me, and it will bear repeating. For Augustine’s City of God and anti-pelagian treatises
leave the impression that, from 410, he grew increasingly skeptical about what people and political
systems might achieve. Indeed, one could argue that Augustine’s skepticism acquired a sudden ubiquity
as Pelagians crossed to Africa along with other Christians trying to make sense of the humiliation of their
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recently “converted” empire. But even before 410 and long after, Augustine was also struggling with
another problem, with a movement that had mushroomed during the previous century.
We have already been introduced to the Donatists. That they and Caecilianists turned parts of
North Africa into a war zone is hardly beside the point, because Gregory concedes that the signs of that
struggle in his man’s work somewhat undermine his own attempts to locate an “Augustinian civic
liberalism” in late fourth- and early fifth-century Africa. In the late 380s, Augustine returned from Italy to
find that Donatists outnumbered their rivals, who sensed they were under siege. Donatism originated as
a protest against Caecilian and his “party” early in the fourth century. The Caecilianists were accused of
having collaborated with persecutors or of having fraternized with known collaborators prior to
Constantine’s conversion--and of cooperating with the government’s initiatives to suppress Donatism.
To Augustine’s annoyance, the Donatists refused to listen to (his) reason. The Caecilianists’ leadership
was tainted, they said, and Augustine, to take the higher ground, apparently exaggerated Donatists’
contempt for their competition. He gave history a distorted picture of a militantly puritanical sect and
gave his admirers among political liberals with a prickly problem. As we learned, Augustine eventually
sanctioned legislation that amounted to intimidation to tip the balance in favor of Caecilianist or
“catholic” Christianity in North Africa, concluding that shaking up Donatist secessionists was the best
way to save them (Kaufman 2009).
Gregory joins “those who rightly abhor [Augustine’s] ‘loving’ pastoral logic of coercion” (Gregory
2008, 302-303). Yet Gregory also--and astutely--appreciates that liberalisms, unlike idealisms, cannot
transcend politics. Redistributions of resources and power that accommodate changing circumstances
and answer to principles dear to liberals always require some coercion. To curb corruption, for instance,
authorities may have to penalize bribe-makers and bribe-takers to deter their cronies. Gregory compiles
an inventory of situations calling for coercion--for legislation against commodification of sex or against
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drug abuse--and for regulations for financial markets or for environmental protection. “Any kind of
liberalism,” he says, given its “commitment to individual liberty, is perpetually trying to justify the
rationality of this coercive public order” (306). Hence, Augustinian liberals must not censure Augustine
for having advocated governmental intervention as long as the authorities of his time deprived Donatists
of their places for public worship, their other properties, and their liberty. But Augustine’s protest
against proposals to deprive the most defiant Donatists of their lives saves liberals today from having to
pitch him into the pits to prove their compassion for the underdog. Gregory nonetheless acknowledges
that Augustinian liberals will have difficulty accepting the way Augustine had justified forms of coercion
or “state intervention” now considered utterly unacceptable in some circles. Augustinian liberals, that is,
accustomed to disconnecting love from force will have a “pressing problem” because their man
definitely did not (299).
Contextualizing helps. Augustine believed he was protecting a coalition of churches--thus a
catholic or universal church--against a regional, divisive, eccentric movement that could jeopardize the
new faith’s privileged status. For the Donatists’ premise, making a virtue of secession, undermined
Christianity itself. In paucis veritas, they declared; the few possessed the truth. Illogical, Augustine
answered; that premise or principle would accredit every small fraction of any small faction--and
endorse sects “divid[ing] the limbs of Christ” (Augustine 1909b, 480-81 3.66.75 - 3.67.76; Augustine
2001, 177-78: epistle 185.8-9). The secessionists resisted reassimilation, so their nemesis resisted the
resistance. And, alas, Donatist casualties have become the chief witnesses against Augustine’s
Augustinian liberalism.
Gregory is right to dismiss criticism that goes over the top, decrying the bishop’s “hegemonic
moralizing” and denouncing Christian cruelty (Gregory 2008, 299-300), but the problem remains:
Augustine’s tough love no longer looks much like love. Augustine embarrasses liberals. Gregory might
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have pocketed some profit from the anti-Donatist treatises by connecting love to liberalism as they
sometimes did. For Augustine closely associated both with the Caecilianists--hatred and intolerance
with Donatists. Love is patient with sin to win sinners’ confidence, repentance and--ultimately-reconciliation. Hatred and intolerance lead to secession and enduring enmity. It was infinitely better, in
Augustine’s judgment, to drive or coerce Christians into a church where charity was practiced, as a rule,
than to leave them in the secessionists’ churches (or sects) where obsessions with purity obscured both
the practice and rule of love (Augustine 1909a, 5: 1.3.4; Augustine 1909b, 385-86: 2.21.26).
Gregory seems to have missed that, yet he does not miss much. He combs Augustine’s works for
statements and sentiments that service “an ethic of democratic citizenship” to inspire and inform an
Augustinian liberal’s participation in politics today. To my mind, the results are more liberal than
Augustinian, more liberal than Augustine’s results. But Gregory’s book elucidates exceptionally well the
issues prompting Christian realists, feminists, Rawlsian liberals, and their critics to ponder civic virtues
and to sift the objectives of political participation. The book’s best sentences on Augustine, I believe,
speculate on “the sort of perfectionism [Augustine] encourages” and the connections between that
encouragement and “the creativity of charity,” “enacting . . . love as a way of life and tirelessly
reproaching oneself and one’s strategies for failing” to follow through (Gregory 2008, 313).
And that tireless reproach brings us back to Christian realism, specifically to the “anti-utopian
imperative” Augustine was said to have formulated and Reinhold Niebuhr to have echoed. Robin Lovin’s
new study unsurprisingly places a “Niebuhrian emphasis on the persistence of evil in social and political
life” at the base of what he describes as the antiutopian and counterapocalyptic realisms, which “keep
expectations for human progress appropriately limited.” The latter less discreetly than the former, it
seems, warns those who enthusiastically take up--or take up cudgels against--one or another political
project “overestimate their own virtue” (Lovin 2008, 22). Christian realists, ideally, should prevent
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governments from “overreaching.” Lovin might just as well be aiming at Eric Gregory’s project as at
idealists’ overconfidence when he settles on a realist’s raison d’etre, reminding governments “what
governments are for”: they “provide a limited justice, which makes people neither good nor loving” (3031).
Gregory’s devotion to “restore the primacy of love as crucial in remembering Augustine” has
him hoisting overboard the “strict dichotomy” between justice and love, which, he explains, “seriously
misleads any moral endeavor” (Gregory 2008, 377-78). But Lovin’s realists of all stripes insist on
retaining it. “[T]he first step toward a realistic Christian ethics,” he stipulates, “is to make a distinction
between love and justice. This requires a recognition of the radical demands of love, which can be seen
in Jesus’s imprudent and unreasonable commands.” That seems to put love out of politics and mandate
“an appropriate lowering of expectations for justice” (Lovin 2008, 66).
Gregory’s Augustinian liberals occasionally do, yet sometimes do not, demand too much of
justice and politics, depending on the page they occupy. Lovin’s realists emphasize limits and low
expectations rather than love. They contend that the idea of justice provides norms for a “distinctive
sphere of life that is governed by different [and lower] expectations from those that mark the highest
aspirations of personal life as a comprehensive achievement of human good” (67). According to Lovin,
Augustine’s City of God set the “spheres” for subsequent political theorists to ponder. It remains a
“great theological study of history, philosophy, and politics”; its author was the “first great Christian
realist” (46).
Lovin lavishes “great”s on his subject and on his subject’s subject, although Augustine’s line was
that greatness (or glory)--here, now, and for the foreseeable--would not last. Glory, specifically, was
overrated. Persons “wise by God’s standards” (Augustine 1972, 963: 20.30) must have learned from
God’s revelations in their sacred texts how ill-equipped they were to bring about lasting peace and
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genuine justice in their terrestrial cities. They were living though a long draught, but the good news was
that their true home was celestial. They were pilgrims in time, disinvested in what the rest of the world
considered praiseworthy. And Christians’ “low expectations for their achievements in this world” attest
their realism and piety (Lovin 2008, 49).
Do they therefore duck under political controversies? Neither Augustine nor Lovin consider(ed)
avoidance a respectable alternative to engagement. The former favored practicing “patient goodwill”
and converting citizens by example, yet not by decree or by examples of political passion (Augustine
2001, 36: ep. 138.11). Lovin has practitioners approach their responsibilities--as citizens or magistrates-with “neither a religious ideal of social life nor a religious constitution,” but he commends “a system of
unapologetic politics” (Lovin 2008, 220).
Not for Lovin, then, the prowess religiously-motivated political practitioners need to smuggle
comprehensivist sentiments past Rawlsian liberals and into the public forum. He acknowledges that
there is something to be said in favor of the Rawlsians’ desire to free “democratic politics” from religious
fanaticism, but, much as Gregory does, Lovin senses a rather debilitating timidity behind Rawls’s rush to
shield “reasoned argument” from religious piety. Is rationality such soft butter? Might justice not be
well served by prophetic witness? Think of the transparent ire of Jeremiah, Hosea, and Amos! What
might politics become if the passionately pious withdrew? If Christian realists checked their faith at the
door and practiced politics dispassionately or perhaps apologetically, Lovin insinuates, “fundamental
questions about society’s prevailing values” very rarely would get raised. The faithful would grow less
faithful, more likely to fit in, he continues, than usefully to add to what, echoing Stephen Carter, he calls
“the epistemic diversity” that enlivens and enriches public discussion. Lovin and Carter are as certain as
Reinhold Niebuhr that Christian realists belong in the game. Lovin urges them to should stop trying to
accommodate Ralwsian rules (and fears) and to practice politics unapologetically in both senses of that
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term. Their “unapologetic theology [ought to] express . . . no regrets for presenting itself in its own
terms and [should] expect . . . to be understood” (122-26).
Lovin’s stand could be characterized as unapologetically prophetic--even as messianic. Christian
realism’s resolute opposition to “prevailing values” and currents approaches a near perfect, prophetic
pitch when he puts into evidence “a rigorous religious ideal of identification with the poor.” Gross
inequalities tempt affluent, well-meaning members of society, Lovin says, to settle for “self-satisfied
benevolence that takes pleasure in small donations” and “insulate[s]” donors from meaningful contacts
with the destitute. Unapologetic politics resists such “dilution” (along with arrogance and inflexibility,
towards which prophetic witness tends) and searches for “concrete opportunities for social
transformation” (131). Yet an unapologetic religious realist in Lovin’s drama has something of a
messianic mission as well, because candor about Christian commitments not only has a chance to
transform the tumbledown policies, which, in the example just mentioned, fail to change the ground
rules, to redistribute resources significantly, and to end indigence. What is more important for the fate
of politics itself--and, methodologically, a more far-reaching, high risk enterprise--such candor can save
the public forum itself. Unapologetic theology, that is, fosters “a new kind of political realism that would
reconnect . . . familiar governmental politics,” which ordinarily only looks after the most conspicuous
casualties of market economies, “to the framework of a larger politics that seeks human goods” (145).
Christian realists in public discussions, Lovin imagines, should teach their colleagues by example-colleagues who are partisans of business or of the arts--to “make and answer claims upon one another”
unapologetically (138).
Lovin does not write pretentiously and may detest the term “messianic,” yet he obviously thinks
that Rawlsian liberals and secularists need rescuing from a rationalism, which is far too narrow. Only
when they welcome the religious realists’ “unapologetic assertion of comprehensivist ideas in the public
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forum” will that forum truly be “open.” Only then will discussions there be frank. Only then will the
consensus reached be more spirited than sedative. What secularists see as confessional thrusting
creates the “space” in which a pluralistic society can attend to competing interests and claims in terms
that make sense to those who have and make them. Possibly advocates of all stripes could do the job-and less offensively to Rawlsian liberals, but Lovin nominates politically realistic partisans of religious
traditions “because they form communities of people . . . shaped by an understanding of the human
good and bear witness in the wider society to what that human good requires of all contexts” (148). So it
is not too much of a stretch, I believe, to call Lovin’s turn-around of Rawls messianic?
Still, one can expect only small rewards from debates about terminology. More important for
the purpose of this paper is the fact that Lovin’s chapter on unapologetic “witness” does not refer to
Augustine, leaving behind Lovin’s “first great Christian realist” as it sets some highly idealized
preconditions for deliberative democracy. But Lovin’s Realism and New Realities argues that the public
forum can indeed be redefined to resolve problems caused by those “new realities”--chief among them,
pluralism and “the politics of interest”--and to prevent what Robert Hughes has memorably called “the
fraying of America.” “Unless each context in a pluralistic society makes its own claims unapologetically,”
says Lovin, we may find ourselves inhabiting the shell of a democracy while coping with “pluralistic
totalitarianism” (151).
When she comes across Lovin’s new book, Kristen Deede Johnson may be surprised to learn that
Augustine was omitted (evicted?) from the Christian realists’ prescriptions for engagement in a
pluralistic society. The late antique prelate was immensely helpful to her as she formulated advice to
ethicists and to policymakers facing tensions created by competing interests in pluralistic societies.
Augustine, after all, was no stranger to the “fraying” of African Christianity. The Donatists and Pelagians
claimed to present more authentic versions of the Christianity they professed alongside leading
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spokesmen for churches that came to be called “catholic.” Augustine had no illusion about what citizens
of the celestial city could achieve as pilgrims in time. Peace, pro tempore, among warring interests was
possible; lasting harmony here and now was not. Still, Augustine can be tremendously useful, Johnson
avers, to the faithful struggling “to love, serve and live in the earthly cities”--to serve societies afflicted
by a malignant doubt about its coherence when confronted with plural and rival interests--competing
“loves and desires.” (Johnson 2007, 159-61).
Augustine was “cautious.” He knew that “the realization of the Heavenly City belongs to the age
to come rather than to this age.” So pilgrims, who are citizens of their celestial city and resident aliens in
terrestrial cities, “instead of trying to force the eschatological peace of the Heavenly City, can and
should enjoy the peace of the earthly city as a good from God” (168). And not just enjoy peace, says
Johnson, but they should promote and preserve it. The faithful are “called to be involved,” even as
magistrates--called to be “gentle and humble,” yet, on occasion, administering justice, they should be
firm (171). Johnson, thus far, values her asset, Augustine, as fairly as the other authors we have visited.
She recalls his instructions for Christians in public service, but she eventually throws his caution--and
caution--to the wind. Presumably, Christian realists as well as Augustinian liberals could apparently
learn from Augustine’s ontology and ecclesiology not just how to love, serve, and live in this plural,
disordered world but also “how the diversity of creation can be reharmonized” (173).
To be fair, Johnson seldom crosses this bridge-too-far, setting aside her rather restrained
Christian realism to pick up the lighter-weight and somewhat unrestrained ideas of some Augustinian(?)
liberals. Before we pin down her confidence in the way Augustine provisions the political imagination to
negotiate a route to reharmonization, however, we pause to reassess his alleged confidence that
Christian magistrates might “reorder” “a people’s disordered loves and priorities”--then “subsume . . .
under justice and love” the lust for domination that drives politics (163-65). Assuming exertion of that
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sort, Johnson sweeps into the infield ably manned by Dodaro. Both refer to passages in Augustine’s City
that supposedly monitor the changes one undergoes on becoming a Christian, descriptions that suggest
magistrates may shed their eagerness for eminence as easily as a new-baptized philosopher discards
“false teachings.” And Augustine has consoled himself briefly, identifying “the compulsion of love that
undertakes righteous engagement in affairs” as an antidote to tyranny (Augustine 1972, 880: 19.19).
But he wrote there about motives, not about political maneuvers. He placed service (in his
example, church leadership) above status yet did not intimate that he had known about (or devised) any
stash of specific strategies to hold off “pluralistic totalitarianism,” a disaggregation of civil conversation
into sets of militantly maintained interests. Augustine’s City concedes that terrestrial cities cannot be
ruled without rank or “high position.” Yet it also advises that such superiority tends to authorize a
concomitant servitude that hardly complements Christianity’s witness to “the compulsion of love.” No
additive to the political imagination--not even Christian theology--so shrivels the desires to dominate as
to solve the problems of pluralistic societies (868-69: 19.12).
But Johnson, Gregory, Dodaro, and--to a lesser extent--Lovin, as we learned, think Augustine
adds critically to the resources available to Christians attempting to address, liberally and realistically,
the issues related to social and political dysfunction. Johnson places Augustine’s remarks on the celestial
city--specifically, his encouraging words about that fraction of it in the church--at the center of current
discussions about pluralism, contentious public discourse, and disharmony. The church, “embodied” and
“practiced” Christianity, is that place where Christians try to be what they believe, and where
“communication and action that occur in witness to the faith” create the sort of “mutuality” that Gerald
Schlabach commends. Johnson exports it from the church into the public forum (Johnson 2007, 242-43).
Once there, she presses Lovin’s and Gregory’s complaints about the inadequacy of Rawlsian liberal
pieties. She welcomes discourses freighted with comprehensivist sentiments into that forum, and she
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promises that they will yield “conversations rich and deep” (233). The exchanges “engage the current
realities of pluralism on numerous levels and help foster a hospitable ethos of interaction” (238). Lovin
would approve.
In the context of this review essay, Lovin and Johnson make a good team. They comb through
the Christian tradition for sources for the “hospitable ethos of interaction” that is obviously dear to both
of them. But, as we saw, Lovin’s chapter on unapologetic politics leaves Augustine in the shallows.
Johnson takes him on board; Augustine charts the course of her argument that the church should be the
model for useful, collegial deliberations in the public forum. His role in her book, however, raises a
question that haunts my admiration for her work and for Gregory’s efforts to construct an “ethic of
citizenship.” To what extent have the two reclaimed Augustine? Might the transfer of rules of discourse
from the church to the “state” (to congressional subcommittees or town councils or multi-party talks on,
say, disarmament) be, as Johnson implies, “the church’s political task,” in Augustine’s estimation as well
as in hers? That the church should “develop” “virtuous people, formed in a society built on trust rather
than fear” seems a defensible proposition--and one Augustine would have defended. That the church
should “equip” people “with the skills of discrimination that enable [them] to perceive and interpret the
larger society (and its limitations)” (227) seems to hold as well. Johnson’s description of the challenge of
developing the skills of discrimination draws on the work of Stanley Hauerwas, and I suspect that
Augustine would endorse the result. But that either Augustine or Hauerwas would call the development
of virtue “the church’s political task” is unlikely. Few disagree that “generosity toward those who are
different” is the precondition for collegial conversations, which, conceivably, could lead to something
approximating reciprocal understanding. Nonetheless, expect some defections, among Augustinians, if
one marches “love, humility, hospitality, and grace” from churchyards to sites where intolerance,
intimidation, and conflict usually rule and gives Augustine credit for inspiring the move (246-47).
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Johnson has words for and with others who care little about Augustine’s political legacy yet who
object to transporting Christian virtues into the public forum. She scolds Rawlsian, secular liberals, much
as Gregory does, because their faith in reason leaves “the moral duty of civility” and a concept of a
public good sparsely defended (49-52). She has few kind words for reason’s critics among postNietzscheans, whose infatuation with difference, she says, places “the claims of individuality” and the
need for constant “self-revision” above the desire for harmony (126-29). Augustine, moreover, has a
horrid reputation among most post-Nietzscheans, who, Johnson and Gregory concur, unfairly have
taken him as late antiquity’s impresario of intolerance (Gregory 2008, 299-300; Johnson 2007, 36-38).
That bad reputation is built largely on Augustine’s anti-Donatist treatises and correspondence,
which leave admirers as well as critics cringing, although Johnson leaves the less generous side of
Augustine underdescribed and holds that he conveys “the need to be more gentle,” “even if [his]
conception of conversation is not quite as rich as the one we have been articulating” (Johnson 2007,
245-46). On that count, one might quibble, inasmuch as Augustine’s conversations and concept of
conversation do impress historians of rhetoric as rather rich. He likely learned from Ambrose of Milan
how to reprimand firmly, benevolently, and effectively (Zauna 2005, 99-103). But nothing will turn
Augustine into the man who propped up the religious pluralism of his time. I gather that he would have
subscribed to Johnson’s timely advice that we should be “careful to prevent the church from grafting
into its self-understanding ways of thinking that do not allow it to be seen as a site of true common
good, around which people can be united in shared purpose as a commonwealth in which justice and
peace are actual possibilities” (Johnson 2007, 223-24). But, to repeat, I cannot imagine him agreeing to
accompany Johnson as she crosses from the churches, where people “come together united through
Christ in such a way that their differences do not become ultimate, nor their political identities decisive”
to the public forum where those political identities are decisive (254).
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Augustine’s instructions on that count were clear. “Mark the contrasts,” he said, between the
terrestrial and celestial cities. The chief challenge for the celestial city on pilgrimage in time was survival
in rough seas--in hoc saeculo maligno, in this wicked world (Augustine 1972, 643 and 761-62: 15.26 and
18.1). Citizens of the celestial city were not to forget that they were pilgrims whose work--as menials,
magistrates, and emperors--was, in essence, grief work. The City of God was a reminder, a disorienting
device for those who grew too comfortable in time, too confident in tactics aimed to improve public
policy, too invested in the fate of their estates, too hopeful. Fidgeting with and fussing over
inconsequentials, the concrete yet impermanent, they missed their calling. When Augustine told the
faithful among his readers to “rejoice only in expectation,” he was referring to their coming home to
heaven (831: 18.49). 3
As Gregory reminds us, Augustine’s disenchantment with their impermanent places on earth
was neither “total” nor “final” (Gregory 2008, 361). It is possible for interpreters of his City to stable
some of his ideas--especially, the ones that I feature--and to run with others. Augustinian liberals
understandably try to pry from his ontology, ecclesiology, soteriology, and pastoral counsels something
that makes for a make-over of political discourse or political theology. As long as liberals admit that the
“something” is not “a blueprint for life in the earthly city,” to borrow Johnson’s terms (Johnson 2007,
198-99), they--as she--close companionably with the Christian realists. Johnson seems sometimes to
massage hopes that Augustine might help us reform political discourse and deliberations, yet, at other
times, she modestly looks only to “move us a little closer to humbly and charitably engaging and
reconciling . . . rather than tolerating, ignoring, or indiscriminatorily celebrating our differences” (176).
Augustinian liberalism gets out of hand when, pursuing progressive justice, it enlists the late antique
prelate in attempts to make civic virtues and liberal values epidemic and to accomplish its mission
civilisatrice. Ian Buruma’s observation--that “eventually such missions always come to grief leaving ruins
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where they meant to build utopias”--sounds very Augustinian (Buruma 2003, 6), if only because, on such
missions, arrogance easily overtakes benevolence.
To historians, ethicists, theologians, and political scientists interested in “applied Augustine,” his
unforgettable warning against arrogance may seem appropriate here as a conclusion. When the
Pelagians spread the word that grace received in baptism so reconfigured Christians’ desires that they
might proceed from that point unaided by grace to earn salvation unaided by grace, Augustine
answered that baptism only starts what can never be completed in time (renovatio incipit). Human
infirmities remained in force (Augustine 1913, 79-80: 2.7.9). In time, the body and--presumably, by
extension--the body politic were under the influence of discreditable impulses. As Gregory says,
“Augustine’s frequent pilgrimage imagery of the journey to our homeland,” together with the idea of
sin’s lasting stain, can undermine an “ethics of citizenship” by imparting “the sense that the neighbor is
merely a temporary vehicle for the individual’s journey to eternal beatitude” (Gregory 2008, 337). Fair
enough! One can so stress the viator theme in Augustine’s works, his love for God, sense of sin, and
eschatology to make everything else--civic virtue, friendship, and love for neighbor--seem instrumental
or, worse, bumps in the road. Yet his City of God lends some support to that end. It musters battalions
of examples of injustices, indifference to social justice, and general decadence, which discredit Rome’s
political idealists (Curbelié 2004, 411-25; Curbelié 2007, 20-24). And it devalues what political theorists
and ordinary citizens had heralded as vera via, “the true way,” distinguished public service, which
earned political practitioners popularity and glory. For Augustine, theirs was the wrong way. Even if
civic virtues were diligently practiced enroute and self-interest (privatas res) was sacrificed for the
common good (pro re communi . . . contempserunt). That vera via ought not to be mistaken for piety. It
was politics. Augustine’s City, marking the contrasts, as noted, strives to tidy up those two categories
(Augustine 1972, 204-205 and 1065-66: 5.15 and 22.22).
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He was not always that tidy, but he discovered in Milan that politics and truth had gone their
separate ways. He was at the emperor’s Court, among the top-floor bureaucrats, an orator-for-hire,
angling for a government appointment, editing and broadcasting clients’ reputations, one of the best
flatterers in the business, when he conceded that flattering was falsifying and that everyone around him
knew as much. He denounced politics as a pack of lies, in effect, reducing praise for progress and for
justice to the status of lies told to advance the clients’ interests (Lepelley 1987, 112-13).
So, in 386, Augustine strayed from what colleagues in politics considered the vera via. He
started down a different path and, much later, measured the distance between the two in terms that he
thought corresponded with contrasts introduced by that “wisest of men [who] devoted the whole of this
book [Ecclesiastes] to pointing out this vanity, obviously with the sole intention that we should long for
that life which is not made up of vanity under this sun, but of verity under the sun’s creator” (Augustine
1972, 899: 20.3). When cradled in those contrasts--vanity versus verity; politics versus piety--the routes
they signify seem worlds apart, which Augustine--on pastoral rounds--surely knew was not the case. But
he usually wrote as if they were. We, too, know the routes, politics and piety, crisscross, but
downloading Augustine into realists’ and liberals’ endeavors to make a difference, politically, to control
the traffic along those two routes and improve the conversation at intersections, is tricky. The realists’
restrained hopes for progressive justice and liberals’ search for a consensus or conversation that
encompasses respect for difference typically take Augustine’s hopes for souls as hopes for society.
Given the political disintegration around him, which the very concept of late antiquity hides
from us (Ward Perkins 2006), Augustine’s perspectives on the conflicts plaguing Christianity as well as
the Court and empire might fall in line behind those of agonistic political theorists who, Charles
Mathewes aptly puts it, “picture reality as an archipelago of alterities” (Mathewes 2007, 267), although
he has Augustine heading down a different path (276-77). Still, at times, the prelate’s pessimism bulges
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from the City, as when he compares public officials to thieves (Augustine 1972, 139: 4.4). That
comparison, unless the ablative absolute introducing it--remota justitia--is read as a temporary
condition rather than as an essential characteristic of both larceny and political leadership, betrays
Augustine as utterly staatsskeptisch (Horn 2007, 61-64; Kaufman 2007, 229-30).
Such a conclusion does not preclude his banking into turns that would put Augustine among
ethicists and higher-flying social reformers of our time, and the evidence shows his seemingly sincere
interests in improving the lot of the destitute, enslaved, and death-row inmates (Lepelley 2006, 213-14).
Of course, his skepticism about “the state” and his social concern do not necessarily strike each other
from historians’ ledgers, but they do make it difficult to get the sums right. Had Augustine been more
politically transparent, his ideas could be tracked more easily. Still, it suits that untidiness remains,
because, were it otherwise, applications of his thinking (and faith) to the problems posed by pluralism in
democratic societies possibly would not have tested to such good results the intelligences of our four
authors. The results may not pass the tests of every historical theologian, but they enrich conversation
among historians, ethicists, theologians, and political scientists.
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1

The problem most often cited in studies of such tensions is that of Christian magistrates obliged to torture
witnesses as well as the accused to get to the truth. Augustine counsels judges to bear with the system yet to pray
for their deliverance from its more onerous and morally dubious tasks (Augustine 1972, 859-61: 19.6). Charles
Mathewes discusses the tension in terms of two “ought”s: politics, Mathewes writes, purportedly channeling
Augustine, is “an inescapable mode of life in which we ought to be engaged until the eschaton [with the purpose
of minimizing its corrosive effects on character], but it is not one [mode of life] we ought to enjoy” (Mathewes
2007, 192). Augustine’s episcopal colleagues had little choice about engagement; Emperor Constantine created
diocesan courts or “audiences,” turning bishops into magistrates. And thereafter, they were “neck deep in the
treachery of human society,” says Kevin Uhalde in his insightful study of the “expectations of justice” in late
antiquity (Uhalde 2007, 136-37). Kaiko Raikas thinks that the development was welcomed as an opportunity to
expand episcopal jurisdiction and influence (Raikas 1997, 476-78). Claude Lepelley, however, suggests that
bishops, wary of antagonizing pagans in public administration, had little interest in capitalizing on opportunities
that brought pagans as litigants into their courts (Lepelley 2001, 391).

2

Augustine conceives of justice as a personal virtue alongside temperance, prudence, and courage (Augustine
1972, 535: 13.21; Horn 2007, 62-63). And, as Philippe Curbelié reminds us, he did not think that, on that personal
level, the virtues could be perfectly realized. The completion of justification was to be anticipated (in spe), not
accomplished (in re). Much the same applied to Augustine’s hopes for social justice. On that count, Curbelié 2004,
290-91 refers to Augustine’s eschatological orientation. Paul Weithman’s version of Augustinian liberalism appears
somewhat more compatible with that orientation and, I believe, with Christian realism, albeit a less “robust”
liberalism than Gregory’s. Weithman 1999, 313 plumps for the formation of “habitual restraints on the desire to
dominate.” Gregory 2008, 96-99 thinks this too timid. An Augustinian liberalism that cannot overturn the standard
view of Augustine’s political pessimism, he insists is neither Augustinian nor sufficiently liberal. Unable to forestall
such criticism, Weithman 1999, 318 nonetheless landed a blow before Gregory took him on. It is almost as if he
had foreseen Gregory’s objections: “Christians must conclude that Augustinian liberalism is a politics with limited
ambitions,” Weithman says, “It does not claim . . . that the mutual respect liberalism engenders comes to some
fruition in a Christian love of neighbor.”

3

Charles Mathewes raises three directly relevant questions, answering the first superbly and economically, in the
same sentence that asks it. “How should we inhabit authority in order best to remind ourselves that we undertake
that inhabitation in fear and trembling, and to signal to others that we recognize the difference between the office
we occupy and the person we are” (Mathewes 2007, 186)? The two conditions, translated into adverbs,
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“tentatively” and “humbly,” capture the spirit of Augustine’s likely response to the “how to,” but Mathewes’s
phrases are spot on. The second and third questions, “how a hopeful politics can be civically mobilizing, while still
disconsoling political expectations” and “how more fully to inhabit” hope (241) give Augustinian liberals and
Christian realists plenty of room to maneuver. Hope, after all, can be despair’s close companion and have us racing
from this hopelessly wicked world into the church as sanctuary, even to heaven as a place where the promises, on
which hope feeds, will be fulfilled. But hope can also “fund engagement,” as Mathewes says and “generate the
sort of anger necessary for real change now” (238). Schlabach looks to favor the first, as do I, although I would not
identify the church as the only or most promising place that hope can develop into compassion and ameliorative
action. Dodaro, Gregory, Lovin, and Johnson seem to favor “a hopeful politics [that] can be civically mobilizing.”

